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We know for example that there has never been an incidence where this part has failed, except on one relatively new (low time) aircraft in some country somewhere, sometime , where something happened. We don't even know if the "suspect aircraft" had been in some form of prior accident with some form of bad workmanship on the repair that caused the "alleged failure".
So the thought that our aircraft are not safe before inspecting them for a discrepancy that no-one knows may actually even exist is like saying we as a group should first review each and every SD that has ever been reported on 336/337's and regardless of their "cause" we should inspect and repair/replace the part that failed under said SD. Absurd !
I have contacted Wikipedia about opening a new word catagory called "Feelgineering". We are still working on the description but the basis is it will be a new word that describes a field of study or enterprise that eschews scientific fact and observation, and instead designs and determines outcomes based on "feelings". We will be attempting to use Cessna's handling of this 336/337 issues as the example of good science being thrown out by this new field of study. Likewise we will be gathering the names of the individuals at Cessna who have developed the potential SID to use as examples of the word "Feelgineer".
Pilots are usually smart enough to know when something isn't right. Quite frankly I would have to wonder how one could look at this SID fiasco (as currently presented) as being valid, and at the same time be smart enough to be a pilot.
That being said, this is a great program for the A&P's out there.
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